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Toward the goal of reducing the fatal accident rate of large transport airplanes due to 
loss of control, the NASA Aviation Safety Program has conducted research into flight 
control technologies that can provide resilient control of airplanes under adverse flight 
conditions, including damage and failure.  As part of the safety program’s Integrated 
Resilient Aircraft Control Project, the NASA Airborne Subscale Transport Aircraft 
Research system was designed to address the challenges associated with the safe and efficient 
subscale flight testing of research control laws under adverse flight conditions.  This paper 
presents the results of a series of pilot evaluations of several flight control algorithms used 
during an offset-to-landing task conducted at altitude. The purpose of this investigation was 
to assess the ability of various flight control technologies to prevent loss of control as stability 
and control characteristics were degraded.  During the course of 8 research flights, data 
were recorded while one task was repeatedly executed by a single evaluation pilot. Two 
generic failures, which degraded stability and control characteristics, were simulated inflight 
for each of the 9 different flight control laws that were tested.  The flight control laws 
included three different adaptive control methodologies, several linear multivariable designs, 
a linear robust design, a linear stability augmentation system, and a direct open-loop control 
mode. Based on pilot Cooper-Harper Ratings obtained for this test, the adaptive flight 
control laws provided the greatest overall benefit for the stability and control degradation 
scenarios that were considered. Also, all controllers tested provided a significant 
improvement in handling qualities over the direct open-loop control mode. 
Nomenclature 
AirSTAR  = Airborne Subscale Transport Aircraft Research 
CONOPS  = Concept of Operations 
CHR  = Cooper-Harper Rating 
FCS  = Flight Control System 
FCL    =  Flight Control Law 
GPS  = Global Positioning System 
GTM  = Generic Transport Model 
IMU  = Inertial Measurement Unit 
INS  = Inertial Navigation System 
IRAC  = Integrated Resilient Aircraft Controls 
IVHM  = Integrated Vehicle Health Management 
LOC  = Loss of Control 
LPS        =  Load Protection System 
MOS  = Mobile Operation Station 
NASA  = National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
STS  =   Stick-To-Surface 
  = Angle of attack 
  = Angle of sideslip  
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I. Introduction  
Loss of control (LOC) has been one of the leading contributors to the fatal accident rate of large commercial 
transport airplanes
1
. LOC accidents are complex in that they typically have many causal factors and precursors, and 
they are difficult to analyze because they often involve excursions beyond the normal flight envelope.  For example, 
LOC accidents have exhibited post-stall angles of attack and/or steep pitch and bank attitudes which exceed both 
autopilot design limits and pilot training requirements and therefore can make recovery to normal flight challenging. 
Research has been conducted over the past decade to better understand the complex flight dynamics 
characteristics of large transports in abnormal flight conditions2-4. Wind-tunnel experiments have documented highly 
non-linear and degraded aerodynamic stability and control characteristics that occur at high angles of attack or with 
airframe damage.  Based on these experimental data, aerodynamic models have been developed and used in piloted 
simulations to demonstrate flight characteristics in LOC conditions including stalls, departures, and control system 
failures. An important characteristic measured in these data is the degradation of stability and control characteristics 
that occurs when angle of attack is increased beyond the normal flight envelope.  
One of the emerging solutions to the LOC problem is the use of adaptive control technologies that can recognize 
potentially dangerous flight conditions arising from such things as degraded stability and control characteristics. 
These control technologies enable the control law to change its behavior to optimize controllability, thus enabling 
aircraft recovery from scenarios that could otherwise result in an accident.  Other technologies include onboard 
system monitoring and identification, controls reconfiguration, and optimal flight path control.  
Flight validation of control technologies aimed at the loss-of-control problem has been recognized as a 
significant challenge due to the difficulties and risks associated with full-scale testing of transport airplanes in 
abnormal flight regimes.  In response to this need, the NASA Aviation Safety Program developed flight test methods 
using subscale flight vehicles to effectively validate the necessary technologies without excessive risk.  The 
Airborne Subscale Transport for Aircraft Research (AirSTAR) is a state-of-the-art facility specifically designed for 
the purpose of investigating and validating high-payoff technologies aimed at the LOC problem5, 6.  
The AirSTAR infrastructure was designed to support the aeronautics research objectives of the Integrated 
Resilient Aircraft Control (IRAC) and Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) projects.  These projects 
emphasize flight research under adverse conditions such as upsets (unusual attitudes and post-stall flight), control 
surface faults, damage (e.g. missing wing segments), and sensor failures. AirSTAR vehicles are designed for testing 
in regimes beyond the normal flight envelope and/or with degraded stability and control characteristics.  
This paper discusses the use of piloted evaluations to assess the ability of both adaptive and conventional flight 
control laws to provide resilient control of a 5.5% dynamically scaled remotely piloted airplane when the stability 
and control characteristics are degraded. In this investigation, the pilot ratings are used as a comparative measure as 
opposed to a predicting full-scale airplane handling qualities. It should be noted that all ratings are from a single 
pilot and that, in general, repeated measurements were not made. Because of the sparse data set, this study should be 
considered an initial screening study to guide future research.  
 
II. System Overview  
A. Concept of Operations 
The AirSTAR infrastructure is comprised of a research flight vehicle, the mobile operation station (MOS), and the 
safety pilot as illustrated in Fig. 1 The MOS is comprised of a flight test control room and the research pilot station 
as well as systems and engineering stations. As illustrated in Fig. 1, takeoff and landing is accomplished by a safety 
pilot using direct visual contact and conventional radio control equipment.  After takeoff, control is transferred to the 
research pilot. The research pilot executes all flight test maneuvers from inside the MOS, using a synthetic vision 
display drawn from telemetry data and a local terrain database. When using this concept of operation, the safety 
pilot is responsible for both flight termination function and reversionary flight control capability. Thus, all 
maneuvers must be performed within visual range of the safety pilot.  This concept of operation provides a flexible 
environment to conduct flight research and rapidly evaluate research flight control laws with minimal risk to persons 
and property.  
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B. Airplane Description 
This study was conducted using a remotely piloted unmanned model airplane. The airplane is not only 5.5% 
geometrically scaled, but also dynamically scaled. Dynamic scaling techniques
7
 were used so that the flight 
dynamics of the model would be appropriately scaled and representative of a generic transport airplane with twin 
under wing mounted engines and a convention tail. This AirSTAR vehicle is referred to as the Generic Transport 
Model (GTM), tail number T2.  The mass properties of the airplane represent a transport airplane with a standard 
load configuration at mid weight and mid center of gravity. The subscale airplane has a wingspan of 6.8 feet and 
length of 8.5 feet. The airplane has a takeoff weight of 58 pounds and a typical landing weight of 48 pounds. The 
airplane is powered by two jet engines, which each produce 16 pounds static thrust. 
The airplane has a complete set of flight test instrumentation. The airplane has a micro-Inertial Navigation 
System (INS) which outputs 3-axis linear accelerometer measurements, angular rate measurements, Euler angles, 
and GPS velocity and position.  An analog micro-Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) which provides redundant and 
low latency 3-axis linear accelerometer and angular rate measurements is also installed. This low latency micro-
IMU is the primary rate and acceleration feedback source to the flight control laws. Air data instrumentation is 
mounted on wingtip booms (visible in Fig. 2) that measure angle of attack, angle of sideslip, dynamic pressure, and 
static pressure. A thermocouple is flush mounted on the fuselage to measure outside air temperature.  The primary 
flight control surfaces: ailerons, elevators, and rudders are equipped with control surface position transducers. 
Furthermore, the rudder is divided into upper and lower surface segments and the left and right elevators are divided 
into four segments. The purpose of dividing the flight control surfaces is to have control redundancy. Modified 
commands can be sent to the redundant surfaces to degrade the airplane stability and control characteristics. 
Secondary surfaces on the airplane are inboard and outboard spoiler panels which are used for roll control (in some 
of the research flight control laws), speed brake function, and, on demand, flying qualities degradation.  
To meet dynamically scaled weight and inertia targets, the system uses a ground based flight control computer. 
All control laws are run on the ground-based computer, with the resultant commands being uplinked to a flight 
control unit located onboard the airplane. This unit handles sensor data collection, telemetry serial stream parsing 
and creation, command switching, and actuator command generation. The telemetry link is comprised of an L-band 
uplink and S-band downlink. The update rate is 200 Hz.  
 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of AirSTAR concept of operations. 
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C. Flight Control System Description 
The AirSTAR Flight Control System
6
 (FCS) uses a reversionary build-up approach to mitigate the risks 
associated with flight testing complex research control laws. Complexity is added in distinct stages that can be 
quickly transitioned using a two-switch “arm” and “engage” process. The FCS is separated into three flight control 
law (FCL) modes, shown in Fig. 3. These three control law modes are mutually exclusive; only one can be active at 
a time. Mode 1 is a direct, stick-to-surface (STS) control law composed of stick shaping only; no sensor feedback is 
used. This mode has a simple design by choice and has proven to provide adequate flying qualities for a wide range 
of test techniques. Mode 2 is the baseline conventional (non-adaptive) closed-loop controller and was not evaluated 
during this investigation. Mode 3 is reserved for the research control laws, and can contain numerous FCLs. 
Thirteen research FCLs are currently implemented, and eight of those research FCLs and one direct stick-to-surface 
FCL were evaluated during this study.  
The FCS also contains auxiliary modules that can be used in conjunction with Modes 1, 2, or 3: a Wavetrain 
module, a Model Tracking & Failures module, and a Load Protection System (LPS) module. The Wavetrain module 
provides the capability to inject arbitrary automated control surface perturbation commands. The perturbation 
commands are added to the active commands (Fig. 3), upstream of the LPS and Model Tracking & Failures 
modules. The primary purpose of the perturbations is to perform system identification analysis. The Model Tracking 
& Failures module, positioned downstream of the Wavetrain input module in Fig. 3 provides the capability to 
simulate failures during flight by modifying any of the control surface commands. A large number of user-defined 
failure profiles can be implemented, which are then selected and engaged by the flight test engineer during flight 
research. The purpose of the LPS is to prevent the FCS from commanding control deflections that would result in 
excessive structural load on the test aircraft. The Transfer Logic module provides mode arming, engagement, and 
safety related mode engagement inhibits. The input selection module ensures that when mode changes occur, the 
surface commands remain transient free. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Generic Transport Model tail number T2. 
 
Figure 3. AirSTAR flight control system high level block diagram. 
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D. Cockpit Description 
The AirSTAR MOS serves as both a flight test control room and remotely piloted vehicle cockpit. Figure 4 
shows a photo of the cockpit with the pilot in the foreground. The test conductor is seated to the pilot’s right, while 
the FTE is seated on the pilot’s left (not shown in photo). The flight test engineer manages systems and research 
functions so that the pilot can keep his hands on the throttles and control stick at all times. The airplane is flown with 
a side-stick controller. The stick forces are provided by springs and are proportional to displacement. Maximum 
deflection of the control stick is 28 degrees from center, which equates to an approximate 3 inch displacement at the 
location of the pilots thumb and index finger. A summary of the stick force characteristics is presented in Table1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1. Side-Stick Controller Force Characteristics 
 
Direction  of 
Movement 
Breakout 
Force 
(lbs) 
Maximum 
Force 
(lbs) 
Left 0.4 2.9 
Right 0.4 3.0 
Forward 1.0 3.4 
Aft 1.3 3.7 
 
 
 
Figure 4. AirSTAR research cockpit. 
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III. Failure Simulation and Stability Degradation Descriptions 
Designing controllers to accommodate aircraft failures is a particularly challenging problem due to the lack of a 
priori knowledge of the resulting aircraft stability and control characteristics. In simulation a wide range of 
conditions may be evaluated via Monte-Carlo, however for flight test evaluation the test matrix is very limited.   It is 
important, therefore, to choose a test scenario that is general in nature and representative of a class of potential 
failure conditions.   In this study three failure cases were considered for evaluation, an asymmetric elevator failure, 
latency injection in the feedback loop, and degraded aircraft stability.    
The asymmetric elevator failure was implemented as a “stuck surface”, with one side of the segmented elevator 
being frozen at its trim condition.  This caused a 50% decrease in pitch authority and introduces a pitch/roll coupling 
in the vehicle’s response to longitudinal stick inputs.  In the open-loop system this failure made it more difficult for 
the pilot to perform precision turns. The closed-loop controllers, however, could easily accommodate this type of 
failure to the point where the pilot could not detect its occurrence. Since the asymmetric elevator failure was not 
useful as a performance discriminator it was dropped as one of the common test conditions and will not be detailed 
here further. 
An increase in signal latency is not easily tied to a particular physical system failure; however, as a generic 
measure of controller robustness it is still very useful. It is closely related to the phase margin in linear controller 
analysis and controllers with a high sensitivity to time delay tend to be sensitive to model fidelity or instrumentation 
errors. For in-flight evaluation each controller was subjected to pure time delay in the actuation path. Once initiated, 
this delay was continually increased (in 5 msec increments and held for 5 seconds before the next increment was 
applied) as the controller followed reference stick-input commands until the response was deemed to be a sustained 
oscillatory divergence. Controllers which tolerated high time delays are more robust, but may not provide adequate 
performance under failure conditions.  
The most comprehensive controller test was multi-axis degradation of stability and control characteristics. These 
scenarios posed a significant challenge for the flight control systems to retain baseline handling qualities.  The goal 
of the control laws was to enable pilot ratings which were consistent with baseline ratings as the stability and control 
characteristics were incrementally degraded. Three failure scenarios were used in this investigation. Scenario “A” 
represents the baseline airframe with all control surface commands being nominal. Scenarios “B” and “C” used 
redundant flight control surfaces, scheduled with angle of attack or roll rate to degrade the longitudinal static 
stability and the roll damping simultaneously (Fig. 5). Scenario B provides approximately neutral longitudinal static 
stability and neutral roll damping. Scenario “C” provides unstable longitudinal static stability and unstable roll 
damping.  For scenario “C” the apparent (to the FCL) Cmα and Clp are positive in sign (unstable) and approximately 
25% of the baseline magnitude. This approach to stability degradation also has the effect (while engaged) of 
degrading the nominal elevator effectiveness by 50% and eliminating the option of using roll spoiler.  Activation 
and deactivation of these degradations were controlled by the flight test engineer upon the pilot’s verbal command. 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 5. GTM with control surfaces used for stability and control degradation highlighted. 
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IV. Evaluation Task Description 
One of the objectives of the IRAC project is to advance the state of the art of adaptive flight control technologies 
as a design option to provide stability and maneuverability margins for safe landing in the presence of adverse 
conditions, including damage and failure. Two tasks were used in this inflight study. The first, which involved flying 
a figure 8 pattern, was to determine controller sensitivity to time delay. The second task was more comprehensive 
and did not include artificial time delay. That (offset-to-landing) task was developed to provide a high gain, high 
precision and operationally relevant maneuver to evaluate the performance of the various control laws in providing 
adequate handling qualities and maneuver performance in the presence of simulated failures or damage to the 
airplane.  Better controllability, of course, leads to higher probability of safe and survivable landings. Data used to 
assess the effectiveness of the control laws included time-history parameter recordings, pilot comments, and a pilot-
assigned Cooper Harper Rating (CHR). Figure 6 shows the CHR scale and logic for each rating. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To assess controller sensitivity to time delay, the defined task was to continuously fly a figure 8 profile at 
constant airspeed and altitude. The pilot was not required to fly to precise tolerances. While the pilot was performing 
this task, a system failure simulation was engaged. That failure simulation injected artificial time delay in all the 
control surface actuator command paths. Once started, the time delay was continually increased in discrete 5 msec 
steps. On straight legs, to evaluate command tracking capability, the pilot alternately exercised the pitch and roll 
axes with long duration, small amplitude doublets. The task was considered complete when a sustained divergent 
oscillatory response was noted or the incremental time delay reached the maximum (200 msec).   
The offset-to-landing task was started 100 feet left, 100 feet above and 1,800 feet downrange of a target 
reference position. This maneuver normally took about 15 seconds and required the pilot to perform an “s-turn” to 
align with the runway. To manage the risk of damage to the model airplane, the offset-to-landing task profile was 
performed at a normal operational altitude (1,000 feet above ground level). The task was performed by momentarily 
biasing the pilot’s synthetic Head Up Display (HUD) to give the compelling appearance of being on a short, offset 
final approach. The pilot’s task was to penetrate a touchdown zone target box at a 3 degree descent angle with the 
wings level. A landing flare was not performed. The task was considered finished when the eye point descended 
below the altitude of the target box. At task completion the pilot assessed performance by referencing the bank angle 
pointer and flight path marker to green markers on the synthetic display which represent target, desired, and 
adequate task criteria (Fig. 7).  Table 2 details the target, desired, and adequate task performance criteria to be 
applied when the target box altitude was penetrated.   
 
Figure 6. Cooper-Harper rating scale. 
Cooper-Harper ating Scale
Adequacy for Selected
Task or Operation
2
1
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Yes
Yes
Yes
Satisfactory
without
improvement?
Adequate
performance
with tolerable
workload?
Is it
controllable?
No Deficiencies
warrant
improvement
No Deficiencies
require
improvement
No Improvement
mandatory
Aircraft
Characteristics
Demands on Pilot in
Selected Task or Operation
Pilot
Rating
Excellent
Highly desirable
Pilot compensation not a factor for
desired performance.
Good
Negligible deficiencies
Pilot compensation not a factor for
desired performance.
Fair - some mildly
unpleasant deficiencies
Minimal compensation required for
desired performance.
Minor but annoying
deficiencies
Desired performance requires moderate
pilot compensation.
Moderately objectionable
deficiencies
Adequate performance requires
considerable pilot compensation.
Very objectionable but
tolerable deficiencies
Adequate performance requires
extensive pilot compensation.
Major deficiencies
Adequate performance not attainable with
maximum tolerable pilot compensation.
Controllability not in question.
Major deficiencies
Considerable pilot compensation is
required for control.
Major deficiencies
Intense pilot compensation is required
for control.
Major deficiencies
Control will be lost during some portion
of required operation.
* (Cooper-Harper Ref. NASA TND-5133)
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In general, 4 offset-to-landing task profiles were flown for each of the control laws that were evaluated. The first 
profile flown was for practice and was not rated or commented on by the pilot. The following three were the 
sequence of scenarios A, B, and then C. Immediately after each offset-to-landing task, the test conductor questioned 
the pilot, who provided concise commentary about: controllability, task performance, workload tolerability, and 
level of pilot compensation. CHRs where not obtained at that time. This was due to limited endurance of the model 
and the compressed size of the test range which created high pilot workload. CHRs were obtained within 10 minutes 
of the evaluation tasks being completed. This occurred as the pilot viewed a fully synchronized playback of all 
displays, audio (including in-situ comments about workload, compensation, etc.), and video of the tasks just flown. 
At that time, the pilot expanded on his inflight comments, then assigned a CHR while referencing the rating scale 
flow chart. Non integer CHRs were not allowed. While in flight, the pilot was allowed to request a scenario repeat if 
he felt he made a technical error effecting task execution. All CHRs are reported. None are averaged.  
Note that in this study, the CHRs are being used as relative indicators of handling qualities. CHRs obtained in 
this study would not necessarily equate to those obtained in the operation of the full scale airplane. This is for 
several reasons. Although the flight dynamic response of the model airplane is scaled (4 times faster than the full 
scale airplane), the human pilot is not dynamically scaled. Also, the pilot in this study is piloting remotely and using 
a cockpit not representative of a full scale transport airplane cockpit. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  HUD showing (in green) target markers for: flight path, touchdown zone, and bank angle. 
Table 2. Offset Landing Task Criteria 
 
 Target Desired Adequate 
Bank Angle, deg 0 ±  10 ±  20 
Flight Path Angle, deg -3 ±    1 ±   3 
Lateral Offset, feet 0 ±  12 ±  24 
Longitudinal Offset, feet 0 ± 164 ±363 
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V. Research Flight Control Law Descriptions 
Research control algorithms for the study were provided by a number of academic and industry participants, 
each working in the 3
rd
 year of NASA Research Announcement awarded grants/contracts from NASA’s Aviation 
Safety Program, Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control Project.   The designs were based on a common non-linear 
simulation model.   This model included an expanded aerodynamic database for the vehicle, as well as detailed 
models for engines, control surface actuators, sensors, and time delay effects introduced through the avionics.  It 
also contained a set of failure cases for structural faults and control surface failures.  These included control power 
and mass/inertia changes, as well as aerodynamic increments based on wind tunnel testing of the failed 
configuration.  Many of the controllers were designed against these failures, however in flight a generalized stability 
degradation fault was implemented, as discussed earlier. All the intended testing was to be performed at a single 
flight condition, trimmed flight at 1.3Vstall + 5 knots, where Vstall is the 1g stall speed. Therefore the controllers were 
generally designed against a single reference model, without gain scheduling or other explicit consideration of 
aerodynamic nonlinearities.   
Although the simulation model was common to all participants, the designs were not otherwise constrained, 
and several different approaches were considered. The control algorithms tested included a direct stick-to-surface 
system, a decoupled stability augmentation system, 4 linear multivariable feedback controllers, 2 adaptive 
augmentation controllers, and 1 all-adaptive control law. Each controller highlighted different aspects of the desired 
robustness to faults, as well as different targets for nominal response characteristics, and different pilot reference 
commands. Table 3 summarizes these general design characteristics. A full description of the design methods and 
their implementation is provided in the references
8-12
 and in analysis papers from the same authors being prepared 
concurrently with this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3. Controller Suite, Design Methods and Reference Command Axes 
 
  Command   
ID Design Method Pitch 
Axis 
Roll 
Axis 
Yaw 
Axis 
Reference # 
1.0 Direct Pilot Control Elevator Aileron Rudder - 
3.3 
Deriv. Free MARC 
Adaptive Augmentation 
Pitch Rate Roll Rate Rudder Yucelen, et.al. (Ref. 8) 
3.4 
LQR 
Linear Optimal 
Pitch Rate Roll Rate Rudder Yucelen, et.al. (Ref. 8) 
3.5 
LQR 
Integrated Propulsion 
α Roll Rate β Crespo, et.al. (Ref. 9) 
3.7 
L1 
All Adaptive 
α Roll Rate β Gregory, et.al. (Ref. 10) 
3.8 
Stability Augmentation 
Robust Linear 
Elevator, 
SAS 
Aileron, 
SAS 
β Dorobantu, et.al. (Ref. 11) 
3.9 
H-Infinity 
Robust Linear 
α 
Aileron, 
SAS 
β Dorobantu, et.al. (Ref. 11) 
3.10 
Composite MRAC 
Adaptive Augmentation 
α Roll Rate β Gadient, et.al. (Ref. 12) 
3.11 
LQR-PI 
Linear Optimal 
α Roll Rate β Gadient, et.al. (Ref. 12) 
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VI. Results 
Phase margin, or in a more general setting time-delay margin, is an important design consideration for feedback 
controllers.  Generally, high-gain and high-performance controllers will exhibit a sensitivity to time delay in the 
control path, and this indicates a lack of robustness to instrumentation lags and to broader forms of model 
uncertainty. The process of tuning a control algorithm varies widely with design method, but it almost always 
involves exploring the fundamental trade between performance and robustness.     
In the AirSTAR flight tests, time delay served as a proxy for robustness. Each controller was tested against a 
simulated latency failure condition. During simulated failure, the pilot performed low-gain horizontal figure-8 
maneuvers and both pitch and roll axis doublets. The injected time-delay caused the response characteristics to 
degrade and become oscillatory. When the oscillatory response was judged to be sustained and growing, the latency 
fault was terminated. This was not a precise measure of the onset of instability, but did represent the time delay at 
which the vehicle was rapidly becoming uncontrollable. The latency test results are detailed in Table 4. The 
maximum latency tested was limited to 200 msec. 
All of the offset-to-landing task evaluations were performed over the course of the final 3 days of a 14 day flight 
test campaign conducted between August 29 and September 11, 2010. All sorties were flown in compliance with an 
FAA certificate of authorization at Allen C. Perkinson / Blackstone Army Airfield (KBKT) located in Blackstone, 
Virginia. Earlier in the campaign, the research pilot gained FCL familiarity when he flew the suite of flight control 
laws while performing other evaluation tasks and maneuvers.  To minimize the effect of learning during the offset-
to-landing task, day-of-flight simulation sessions were performed. During these simulation sessions, the research 
pilot was able to rapidly perform a series approximately 30 offset-to-landing tasks. Failure scenarios were not 
engaged during the day-of-flight simulation sessions. To minimize the effect of winds aloft the simulator was loaded 
with the current “1,000 ft” winds aloft measured by the Nation Weather Service Doppler weather radar (WSR-88D) 
located in Wakefield, Virginia. To minimize the effects of low altitude turbulence due to diurnal heating, research 
flights began at 30 minutes after sunrise. Typically, flight operations were ceased about 4 hours after sunrise (when 
turbulence adversely affected data quality). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Time Delay Resulting in Unstable Dynamics During Inflight Evaluations 
 
ID DESIGN METHOD Injected Time Delay 
3.8 
Stability Augmentation  
Robust Linear 
> 200 msec 
3.4 
LQR 
Linear Optimal 
200 msec 
3.9 
H-Infinity 
Robust Linear 
185 msec 
3.5 
LQR 
Integrated Propulsion 
110 msec 
3.7 
L1 
All Adaptive 
105 msec 
3.3 
Deriv. Free MARC 
Adaptive Augmentation 
105 msec 
3.11 
LQR-PI 
Linear Optimal 
70 msec 
3.10 
Composite MRAC 
Adaptive Augmentation 
65 msec 
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Table 5 provides the concise summary comments and CHRs that the AirSTAR research pilot provided for the 
offset-to-landing task evaluations. These data are tabulated by flight number and also contain the pilot’s qualitative 
assessment of turbulence during the flight. For each of these flights, one inflight practice offset-to-landing task was 
performed to further mitigate the effects of learning. Additional practice was not conducted due to fuel limitations. 
The pilot did not provide comments or ratings associated with the practice task. After execution of the practice task, 
scenarios A, B, and C were flown in a buildup sequence. The elapsed time between the start of each successive task 
was approximately 90 seconds. Because the entire failure buildup was completed in less than 5 minutes, the effects 
of turbulence and crosswind are considered constant during the time that each individual control law was being 
evaluated. Table 6 documents notes and expanded pilot comments from evaluation flight debriefings. Time history 
and trajectory plots for all FCLs and scenarios can be found in the figures 8-16. These plots are useful for 
understanding pilot comments and ratings.  
On two occasions the research pilot requested a repeat because he felt his performance compensating for 
environmental effects was abnormal and compromised the result. The first occasion was on flight 39, during the 
very first task rating attempt; the pilot stated that he made an error in his crosswind compensation. The second 
occasion was on flight 44, during evaluation of the direct (no feedback) control mode with scenario A; the pilot felt 
that turbulence had significantly degraded his performance. The pilot’s qualitative assessment of turbulence for that 
flight was “moderate or greater” and was substantiated by spectral analysis of in-flight vertical gust estimates. It 
should be noted that the pilot did not bias his evaluations to compensate for environmental or other factors. Pilot 
comments regarding effect of crosswind, turbulence or other factors are captured in Table 6. The pilot did state that 
he felt the effects of crosswind and turbulence caused some of his CHR ratings to be biased 1 CHR higher than they 
otherwise would have been.  
A review of Table 6 and inspection of time history data plots in figures 8-16 shows that the most challenging 
aspect of the failures was controllability in the roll axis. This is attributed to the aspect of the failure scenarios that 
reduced roll damping. On several occasions, the pilot commented on persistent limit cycle oscillations during 
scenario B. Scenario C was most often abandoned due loss of control in the roll axis. The exception to this was FCL 
3.5 which integrated propulsion control with the pitch axis control. For scenario A, the pilot comments included 
statements that the airplane was difficult to trim and that he was “working pretty hard”. For this controller, scenario 
C was abandoned late in the run due to activation of the FCS loads protection system when normal load factor 
exceeded task limits.  
Table 7 shows further simplification of the evaluation data in Table 5. The sorting (top to bottom) in this table 
represents the degree to which an individual controller retained its baseline handling qualities for scenario B 
(inflight simulation of neutral stability: Clp ~ 0 and Cmα ~ 0, elevator effect degraded 50%, and spoilers 
inoperative). Care should be taken not to directly compare design methodologies, especially for the baseline 
scenario. This is because of the variations in individual control law design detail, variation in test day conditions, use 
of a single evaluation pilot, and variation in control law design philosophy relating to controller performance vs. 
stability tradeoffs. Table 7 makes use of the following definition: Level 1 = 1 ≤ CHR ≤ 3, Level 2 = 4 ≤ CHR ≤ 6, 
Level 3 = 7 ≤ CHR ≤ 9. The table is color coded green, yellow, red respectively. Black color coding indicates loss-
of-control or task abandoned. These data show that in this study, all the adaptive controllers that were tested 
preserved level 2 handling qualities for scenario “B” and the ability to control the airplane for scenario “C” was also 
preserved.  Particularly noteworthy is that for FCL 3.10, the pilot rating did not degrade when scenario “B” was 
tested. The piloted noted small oscillations (Fig. 11) for that scenario, but it did not significantly affect his workload, 
compensation, or task performance. FCL 3.7 degraded gracefully (down 2 CHR per fault) and completed scenario 
“C” with CHR 7 (Table 7 and Fig. 10). With the exceptions of FCLs 3.10 and 3.7, scenario “C” ratings indicate loss 
of control, or questionable controllability. Despite the handling qualities cliff for scenario “C”, FCL 3.9 preserved 
handling qualities for scenario “B” to a degree that was comparable to some of the adaptive FCLs (Table 7 and Fig. 
10). The most abrupt drop in handling qualities rating was seen for FCL 1.0, direct control (no feedback control). 
With the direct control mode, loss of control occurred immediately after the scenario “B” failure was engaged (Fig. 
13). Use of any of the other controllers tested with this scenario provided significantly higher controllability margins 
than the direct control mode.  
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Table 5.  Summary of Comments and Cooper-Harper Ratings From Evaluation Flights 
 
Flight 
# 
Turbulence FCL  Scenario Controllable Performance Workload 
Tolerable 
Pilot 
Compensation 
CHR 
 
 
39 
 
Smooth 
3.9 A 
A 
Yes 
Yes 
Adequate 
Desired 
Yes 
Yes 
Moderate 
Minimal 
- 
3 
3.9 B Yes Desired Yes Considerable 
for Control 
5 
3.9 C No - - - 10 
 
40 
 
Smooth 
3.8 A Yes Desired Yes Minimal 3 
3.8 B In Question Not 
Adequate 
 Considerable 
for Control 
8 
3.8 C No - - - 10 
 
41 
 
Light 
3.7 A Yes Desired Yes Minimal 3 
3.7 B Yes Adequate Yes Considerable 5 
3.8 C Yes Not 
Adequate 
Yes Max Tolerable 
for performance 
7 
 
42 
 
Light 
3.10 A Yes Desired Yes Moderate 4 
3.10 B Yes Desired Yes Moderate 4 
3.10 C Yes Not 
Adequate 
Yes Max Tolerable 
for Performance 
7 
 
 
43 
 
Moderate 
3.11 A Yes Desired Yes Moderate 4 
3.11 B Yes Adequate Yes Max Tolerable 
for Performance 
7 
3.11 C In Question Not 
Adequate 
Yes Intense 9 
 
 
44 
Moderate 
or 
Greater 
1.0 
1.0 
A 
A 
Yes 
Yes 
Desired 
Not 
Adequate 
Yes 
Yes 
Moderate 
Moderate 
4 
5 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
B 
B 
B 
No 
No 
No 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
10 
10 
10 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
Very 
Smooth 
3.3 A Yes Desired Yes Moderate 4 
3.3 B Yes Adequate Yes Extensive for 
Performance 
6 
3.3 C In Question Not 
Adequate 
Yes Intense for 
control 
9 
3.4 A Yes Adequate Yes Moderate 4 
3.4 B Yes Not 
Adequate 
Yes Max Tolerable 
for Performance 
7 
3.4 C In Question Not 
Adequate 
No Intense for 
Control 
9 
 
48 
 
Light to 
Moderate 
3.5 A Yes Desired Yes Considerable 5 
3.5 B Yes Not 
Adequate 
Yes Max Tolerable 7 
3.5 C KIO Loads - - - 10 
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Table 6a. Expanded Pilot Comments and Notes 
 
FCL Scenario Comments  and Notes 
3.9 A Repeated due to cross-wind correction error.  
3.9 B Limit cycle roll oscillation all the way to the box. Diverged when I got in loop … had to stay 
out. Once out of loop … was able to steer to box. 
3.9 C KIO --- roll. Not controllable.  
3.8 A … had a little bit of limit cycle oscillation. 
3.8 B I couldn’t overcome that large limit cycle oscillation … couldn’t get the airplane going 
where I wanted it to go.   
3.8 C As soon as the fault was injected it started to roll off and it was accelerating, so I knocked it 
off. Peak roll rate ~120 deg/sec.  
3.7 A Light turbulence 
3.7 B Had limit cycle oscillations that degraded the maneuver.  I don’t think I was overly 
aggressive, had low damping, airplane responded more than I wanted it to.  
3.7 C …controllability not in question. I felt like it was controllable, but not controllable enough to 
get it in the box.  Limit cycle oscillation with neutral stability fault on order of 30 deg, this 
fault, they were about 50 deg. …large limit cycle oscillations. I was consciously trying to 
not be too aggressive.   
3.10 A It seemed like it wanted to balloon on me and dive a little bit. It was not quite as predictable 
in pitch as I would have liked. Minor but annoying deficiencies.  
3.10 B Flying it to the box seemed very similar to the no fault case except for some slight limit 
cycle roll oscillations superimposed on it. But it really didn’t affect my ability to point the 
airplane and put it in the box. I was able to move the velocity vector around and put it where 
I wanted … it just had slight roll oscillations. It had the same slightly undesirable pitch 
characteristics as the previous scenario.  
3.10 C That was a little bit of a wild ride. It seemed that the control law was rapidly changing in its 
response characteristics. I don’t know if that is that adaptation working. But, it seemed like 
I’d be getting a limit cycle [roll] oscillation and that the oscillations would build and then 
suddenly it would damp and then the oscillations would build and suddenly damp.  
3.11 A I was working pretty hard … making some pretty rapid small inputs that I think were due to 
turbulence.  
3.11 B Performance may not have been adequate [bank angle at touchdown]. We got in the box, but 
frankly we were lucky that we got in the box. Adequate performance not attainable with max 
tolerable pilot compensation.  
3.11 C Barely controllable. I wasn’t high gain in the loop, I was just letting it oscillate and just 
steering the velocity vector around. It was more that it was oscillating around what I was 
trying to command. Compensation was considerable or intense and if you’d have gotten in 
the loop with it you may have lost control.  This one was so oscillatory that I don’t think 
turbulence was a factor.  
1.0 A I think turbulence as a significant factor there. I think without turbulence it would have been 
a 4, maybe a 3. But with the turbulence it was a 4 … border line 5.  
 
When repeated: I’d have to call that a CHR5 (not adequate performance). Without 
turbulence, I’m assuming I’d have gotten adequate performance.  
 
1.0 B I lost control. Diverging roll oscillation. The turbulence was pretty bad on this flight. I think 
we were one CHR off [high] because of the turbulence for the “no fault” scenario. With the 
fault on turbulence didn’t make a difference.  
1.0 C Not applicable 
3.3 A We had quite a bit of crosswind on these runs which was a complicating factor. I think that it 
was a solid CHR 4. Some of my compensation was due to the crosswind. I think if we didn’t 
have the crosswind it would have been a 3.  
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Table 6b. Expanded Pilot Comments and Notes (continued) 
 
FCL Scenario Comments  and Notes 
3.3 B It was adequate performance. With the oscillations going on, I didn’t feel like I could get in 
the loop a whole lot without driving it unstable.  It was considerable to extensive 
compensation for performance. CHR 6 
3.3 C Intense pilot compensation was required for control. We were right on the verge of being out 
of control due to roll oscillations.  
3.4 A On that one I think I botched the lineup due to the crosswind. I think without the crosswind it 
would have been desired performance. It was moderate compensation. CHR 4.  
3.4 B I think I was mostly able to steer the velocity vector of the airplane, but superimposed on 
that, I had large amplitude roll oscillations. So, we were not adequate performance and had 
max tolerable compensation. CHR 7.  
3.4 C Pretty wild. Barely controllable. We were right on the edge of losing control. CHR 9  
3.5 A Just inside desired. I’d say it required considerable pilot compensation. I don’t know if 
turbulence or crosswind was a factor. I was working pretty hard; I’d call that moderately 
objectionable deficiency. Excessive throttle activity made it hard to know when it was 
trimmed. The throttle was always moving and that couples into pitch, so it was hard to know 
when I was trimmed.  
3.5 B Deficiencies were not tolerable. Max tolerable compensation … major deficiencies. CHR 7. 
It was primarily the roll axis, but the pitch axis was difficult as well.  
3.5 C KIO – loads.  Task abandoned due to normal load factor. (+2.3g to -0.25 g).  
 
Table 7. Summary Cooper-Harper Ratings 
 
Flight Control Law 
Cooper-Harper Rating 
No Failure Failure Simulation 
ID Design Method Baseline Neutral Stability Unstable 
3.10 
Composite MRAC 
Adaptive Augmentation 
4 4 7 
3.7 
L1 
All Adaptive 
3 5 7 
3.3 
Deriv. Free MARC 
Adaptive Augmentation 
4 6 9 
3.9 
H-Infinity 
Robust Linear 
3 5 10 
3.5 
LQR 
Integrated Propulsion 
5 7 10 
3.11 
LQR-PI 
Linear Optimal 
4 7 9 
3.4 
LQR 
Linear Optimal 
4 7 9 
3.8 
Stability Augmentation  
Classical Linear 
3 8 10 
Direct 
Stick to Surface 
Open-Loop 
4 10 
Not 
Attempted 
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VII. Concluding Remarks 
 One of the objectives of the NASA Aviation Safety Program’s IRAC project was to advance the state of the art 
of adaptive flight control technologies as a design option to provide enhanced stability and maneuverability margins 
for safe landing in the presence of adverse conditions, including damage and failures. One of the benefits of that 
objective is improved survivability following failures or damage. A single pilot provided Cooper-Harper Ratings to 
evaluate the controllability using a suite of adaptive and non-adaptive flight control laws to perform an offset-to-
landing task. A remotely piloted 5.5% dynamically scaled generic transport model airplane was used for the task. A 
buildup approach was used to conduct this task evaluation for a set of complex multi-axis failure scenarios. The 
scenarios used redundant control surfaces and an in-flight simulation approach to simultaneously: decrease control 
surface effectiveness, decrease longitudinal static stability, and decrease roll damping.  
 For the control laws evaluated in this screening study, the adaptive control laws provided the best combination of 
handling qualities retention and controllability over the full range of failure scenarios tested. The robustness 
indicated by high time-delay margins displayed by the linear controllers did not imply an ability to handle the 
degraded stability failure case. For these failure cases, the controllers with good ability to track pilot commands (as 
opposed to controllers with high time delay margin) received superior pilot ratings.  A robust linear controller with 
reference command inputs provided handling qualities retention comparable to the adaptive control laws for the 
neutral stability failure. However, when using that controller, the handling qualities abruptly degraded for the more 
severe failure. All of the control laws tested (adaptive and non-adaptive) provided significantly better handling 
qualities than did the direct control mode when the stability and control degradation scenarios were introduced. 
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Figure 8. Time history and offset landing trajectories for FCL #3.9. Circles denote scenario “A” 
– no failure, squares denote scenario “B” – neutral stability, diamonds denote scenario “C” – 
unstable; Green boundary denotes desired range, blue boundary denotes adequate range. 
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Figure 9. Time history and offset landing trajectories for FCL #3.8. Circles denote scenario “A” 
– no failure, squares denote scenario “B” – neutral stability, diamonds denote scenario “C” – 
unstable; Green boundary denotes desired range, blue boundary denotes adequate range. 
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Figure 10. Time history and offset landing trajectories for FCL #3.7. Circles denote scenario 
“A” – no failure, squares denote scenario “B” – neutral stability, diamonds denote scenario “C” – 
unstable; Green boundary denotes desired range, blue boundary denotes adequate range. 
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Figure 11. Time history and offset landing trajectories for FCL #3.10. Circles denote scenario 
“A” – no failure, squares denote scenario “B” – neutral stability, diamonds denote scenario “C” – 
unstable; Green boundary denotes desired range, blue boundary denotes adequate range. 
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Figure 12. Time history and offset landing trajectories for FCL #3.11. Circles denote scenario 
“A” – no failure, squares denote scenario “B” – neutral stability, diamonds denote scenario “C” – 
unstable; Green boundary denotes desired range, blue boundary denotes adequate range. 
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Figure 13. Time history and offset landing trajectories for FCL # 1.0. Circles denote scenario 
“A” – no failure, squares denote scenario “B” – neutral stability, diamonds denote scenario “C” – 
unstable; Green boundary denotes desired range, blue boundary denotes adequate range. 
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Figure 15. Time history and offset landing trajectories for FCL #3.4. Circles denote scenario 
“A” – no failure, squares denote scenario “B” – neutral stability, diamonds denote scenario “C” – 
unstable; Green boundary denotes desired range, blue boundary denotes adequate range. 
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Figure 14. Time history and offset landing trajectories for FCL #3.3. Circles denote scenario 
“A” – no failure, squares denote scenario “B” – neutral stability, diamonds denote scenario “C” – 
unstable; Green boundary denotes desired range, blue boundary denotes adequate range. 
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Figure 16. Time history and offset landing trajectories for FCL #3.5. Circles denote scenario 
“A” – no failure, squares denote scenario “B” – neutral stability, diamonds denote scenario “C” – 
unstable; Green boundary denotes desired range, blue boundary denotes adequate range. 
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